Involuntary Medication and the Case of Joyce Brown by Cournos, Francine
736 July 1989 Vol. 40 No. 7 Hospital and Community Psychiatry
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Francine Cournos,
M.D., Maureen Empfield, M.D., Ewald
Horwath, M.D., and Martin Kramer,
M.D., for information about the mcdi-
cal and psychiatric aspects of HIV, and
Robin Goldman, J.D., for assistance in
developing the legal analysis.
References
1. Kelley KV: AIDS and ethics: an oven-
view. General Hospital Psychiatry
9:331-340, 1987
2. Gosten L: Public health strategies for
confronting AIDS: legislative and regu-
latory policy in the United States.
JAMA 261:1621-1630, 1989
3. Binder R: AIDS antibody tests on in-
patient psychiatric units. American jour-
nal of Psychiatry 144: 176-181, 1987
4. Article 4419b-1, Vernon’s Texas Civil
Statutes, Section 9.02 (1987)
5. 146.025 (2)(a), Wisconsin Statutes
(1987-1988)
6. Guardianship of Anthony, 402 Mass
723 (Sup Ct Mass, 1988)
7. Centers for Disease Control: Update:
universal precautions for prevention of
transmission of human immunodefi-
ciency virus, hepatitis B virus, and other
bloodborne pathogens in health care
settings. Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 37:377-382, 1988
8. Section 413, New York Social Service
Law (McKinney, 1978)
9. AIDS policy: guidelines for inpatient
psychiatric units. American Journal of
Psychiatry 145:542, 1988
10. Gostin L, Curran WJ: 1.egal control mea-
sunes for AIDS: reporting require-
ments, surveillance, quarantine, and negu-
lation of public meeting places. Amen-
can Journal of Public Health 77:214-
218, 1987
1 1. Gniswald v Connecticut, 381 US 479
(1966)
12. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC
701 (1973)
1 3. Tarasoff v Regents of the University
of California, 551 P2d 334 (Cal Sup
Ct, 1976)
14. Naidu v Laind, 539 A2d 1064 (Del
Sup Ct, 1988)
15. Holbrook T: Policing sexuality in a mod-
cnn state hospital. Hospital and Com-
munity Psychiatry 40:75-79, 1989
16. Cournos F, Empfield M, Honwath E,
et al: The management of HIV infec-
tion in state psychiatric hospitals. Hos-
pita! and Community Psychiatry
40:153-157, 1989
17. Article 27-F, New York Public Health
Law (McKinney, 1988)
18. Centers for Disease Control: Recom-
mendations for prevention of HIV trans-
mission in health-care settings. Mor-
bidity and Mortality Weekly Report
36:15-17, 1988
19. Gloven v East Neb Comm, Office of
Retardation. 686 F Supp 243 (DC Neb,
1988)
20. Doe v County of Cook, Illinois (DC
N Ill 87-C-68888, Feb 24, 1988)
2 1. School Board of Nassau County v An-
line, 94 L ED 2d 307 at 318.319
(1987)
22. APA position statements outline role
of psychiatrists in combating fear of
AIDS. Hospital and Community Psy-
chiatry 38:433, 1987
23. Appelbaum PS: AIDS, psychiatry, and
the law. Hospital and Community Psy-
chiatry 39:13-14, 1988
24. Cournos F, Horwath E: Confining
AIDS Patients (ltn). Hospital and Com-
munity Psychiatry 39:671, 1988
Involuntary Medication
and the Case of Joyce Brown
Francine Cournos, M.D.
In October 1987, Joyce Brown be-
came the first homeless person re-
moved from New York City’s
streets and hospitalized under a
city initiative that authorized
evaluation of “gravely disabled”
homeless pensonsfor admission to
inpatient psychiatric treatment.
Miss Brown’s highly publicized
and ultimately successful count bat-
tie to prevent a course of forced
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medication is described. Her re-
fusal of medication was upheld
based on hen capacity to under-
stand the proposed treatment and
to express a partially rational
opinion about it. The author,
who served as independent psy-
chiatnic consultant to the court
on the decision about Miss
Brown’s involuntary medication,
uses the case to illustrate some
ofthe problems ofinvoluntary psy-
chiatnic intervention, including
the commitment of competent pa-
tients and the lack ofa coherent
approach to persistent treatment
refusal.
The problem of involuntary treat-
ment recently received worldwide
attention when a patient named
Joyce Brown challenged New
York City’s widely publicized plan
to forcibly hospitalize and treat
mentally ill homeless people who
were living on the streets and me-
fusing mental health services.
In October 1987, a team of
mental health workers from Pro-
ject HELP were authorized by a
liberalized interpretation of New
York State’s long-standing civil corn-
mitment statutes to remove cer-
tam “gravely disabled” individuals
from the streets (1). These mdi-
viduals were to be brought to
Bcllcvue Hospital, where they
could be evaluated for admission
to a special psychiatric ward. Joyce
Brown was the first homeless pen-
son to be hospitalized as a result
of the Project HELP initiative.
Rarely has a case of involuntary
psychiatric intervention inspired
such wide public attention, sug-
gesting that the public has become
increasingly interested in whether
forced psychiatric care is the
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proper response to certain kinds
of homelessness.
I acted as independent psychi-
atnic consultant to the count on
the decision of whether Joyce
Brown, a committed patient, could
be subjected to a course of invol-
untaily administered antipsychotic
drugs. In this paper I examine
some of the issues and conflicts
involved in that decision.
Case developments
J oyce Brown’s hospitalization.
Joyce Brown, who initially identi-
fled herself as Billie Boggs, was a
40-yea-old single black woman
who had been living on the streets
of an affluent Manhattan neigh-
bonhood for a yea and a half,
panhandling to get enough money
for food. On October 28, 1987,
she was picked up by Project
HELP (2). She was taken to
Bellevue Hospital’s emergency
room, committed at Bellevue, and
admitted to the special unit for
the homeless.
Popular attention was focused
on two questions. First, was Joyce
Brown homeless because she was
poor or because she was mentally
ill? And second, should we praise
the efforts of the city to remove
her from her debased cimcum-
stances on support her struggle to
assert hen individual rights in the
face of overwhelming state power?
But while the media focus on Joyce
Brown may have made hem appear
typical of the homeless mentally
ill entering New York City’s new
program, her case was in fact not
representative at all. She was prob-
ably less impaired than most
chronic mentally ill persons. She
was also virtually unique in her
capacity to reconstitute herself (3).
Legal proceedings. Miss
Brown’s case became the object
of three widely publicized court
proceedings during which hen coun-
sd, on hem behalf, waived all of
her rights of confidentiality. Thus
the information in this paper about
Miss Brown comes from the pub-
lic record.
On October 29, 1987, Miss
Brown petitioned for a hearing
to protest hen commitment. At the
subsequent series of hearings, two
entirely different accounts of her
situation emerged. Lawyers for the
city and their psychiatric experts
argued that Miss Brown had schizo-
phncnia, was delusional, and ne-
quined hospitalization because she
represented a danger to herself
by virtue of self-neglect, pro-
vocative behavior, and suicidal im-
pulses. Miss Brown’s lawyers, who
were members of the New York
Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU),
and their psychiatric consultants
asserted that Miss Brown did not
have a serious mental illness, but
was a “professional street person”
whose difficulties on the street
were a natural consequence of be-
ing homeless. They pointed to her
ability to survive on the streets
without harming herself or other
people.
The two accounts ofMiss Brown
were as different as her own ap-
pearancc under varying cincum-
stances. On the streets, she was
dirty, disheveled, malodorous, hos-
tile, and verbally abusive. In court,
she was well-groomed, in control,
logical, coherent, and even witty.
The trial judge, faced with en-
timely contradictory testimony by
psychiatrists, gave considerable
weight to Miss Brown’s national
demeanor and testimony at the
time of the hearing. He ruled that
she did not meet the standard for
commitment and ordered her me-
leased on November 12, 1987 (4).
The city immediately appealed this
decision, and Miss Brown mc-
maimed hospitalized during the ap-
peal. On December 18, 1987, in
a 3-to-2 decision, the appellate
division of the state supreme court
reversed the trial count and up-
held her commitment, citing the
failure of the trial judge to give
sufficient weight to the testimony
of the treating psychiatrists (5).
Miss Brown’s hospitalization was
continued, but she had consistently
refused medication. In New York
State, since the Rivers vs. Katz
decision (6), all nonemengency de-
cisions about the involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs
to committed patients must be
made by a judge. So the city re-
turned to count for the third time,
seeking judicial authorization to
administer a three-week trial of
halopenidol. The remainder of this
paper concerns this attempt to in-
voluntarily medicate Joyce Brown.
Joyce Brown’s illness. In Joyce
Brown’s commitment hearing and
the hearing about her involuntary
medication, the count approached
the problem by first attempting
to determine the extent of Miss
Brown’s mental illness. However,
her case was especially perplexing
because a satisfying answer to this
question was to remain perma-
nently beyond reach.
Miss Brown’s first known con-
tact with the psychiatric system
was a single previous two-week
hospitalization in 1985. Her ad-
mission diagnosis had been atypi-
cal psychosis, rule out paranoid
schizophrenia; her discharge diag-
nosis was paranoid personality dis-
order. Before that hospitalization,
however, she had a 20-yea his-
tony of drug abuse, including use
of cocaine and intravenous heroin.
She had worked for many years
as a secretary, but stopped work-
ing and received Social Security
disability benefits after the 1985
hospitalization. She never resumed
her previous level of functioning
and became homeless in April
1986, after relatives were no
longer able to care for her.
Repeated observations were
made during hen hospitalizations
that Miss Brown was hostile, yen-
bally abusive, socially isolated, and
resistant to treatment. Numerous
instances of screaming, yelling, curs-
ing, agitation, and threatening physi-
cal gestures toward staff and pa-
ticnts were documented. She had
appeared similarly belligerent to
the mental health workers who
observed hem on the streets. For
example, she cursed at passersby,
became angry at offers of help,
and exposed hen nude buttocks
to the outreach psychiatrist. Inter-
mittently she displayed evidence
of a thought disorder, such as talk-
ing in rhymes and offering imnele-
vant answers.
However, city psychiatrists were
unable to prove convincingly that
Miss Brown was psychotic. Her
evasive and somewhat incredible
explanations for her behavior did
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not provide definitive evidence of
the delusions or hallucinations char-
actenistic of psychosis. For exam-
plc, she burned and tore money
with the explanation that the
money had been offered in a con-
descending manner and that, in
any case, keeping money on the
streets was dangerous. She talked
and laughed to herself but denied
that she was responding to voices.
Since she was national and lucid
in count, she may have never been
seriously psychotic. On the other
hand, hen psychosis may have im-
proved in the hospital even with-
out medication, on she may in fact
have been psychotic but may also
have had the desire and ability to
conceal her symptoms.
As for the question of hen danger-
ousness, Miss Brown consistently
denied suicidal and homicidal idea-
ton. She explained that her made-
quate clothing and hygiene were
the consequences of poverty and
homelessness. She denied that she
had been trying to harm herself
during the one occasion when Pro-
ject HELP staff observed hen walk-
ing into traffic. She stated that her
resort to verbal abuse was neces-
say to fend off unwanted offers
of help.
Joyce Brown’s capacity. While
it wasn’t possible to determine the
precise extent of Miss Brown’s
mental illness, the Rivers decision
offered a way to arrive at a dcci-
sion about involuntary medication
by weighing other issues. Accord-
ing to Rivers, the legal standard
for authorizing involuntary treat-
ment involves two elements.
First, the state must demonstrate
“by clear and convincing evidence”
the patient’s incapacity to make a
treatment decision. In the absence
of such incapacity, the patient has
the right to refuse treatment, no
matter how beneficial. Second, if
the patient is determined to lack
capacity, the state must show that
“the proposed treatment is nan-
rowly tailored to give substantial
effect to the patient’s liberty in-
terest, taking into consideration
all relevant circumstances, includ-
ing the patient’s best interests, the
benefits to be gained from the
treatment, the adverse side-effects
associated with the treatment, and
any less intrusive alternative treat-
ments” (6).
If Miss Brown had the capacity
to make her own treatment dcci-
sion, she clearly had the night to
refuse medication. In considering
her case, the distinction between
Too little is known







a mental status examination, in-
tended to provide a global picture
of the patient’s psychiatric func-
tioning, and an assessment of ca-
pacity, which is a more narrowly
focused evaluation, becomes im-
portant. This distinction is fnc-
quently overlooked by clinicians
(McKinnon K, Cournos F, Stanley
B, unpublished paper, 1989).
Many authors in the legal and
psychiatric literature have accepted
a definition of capacity based on
four tests that form a hierarchy.
Each of the four tests provides a
stricter standard of decision-
making ability. These four tests
arc evidencing a choice, factual
understanding of the choice, na-
tional reasoning, and appreciation
(7,8).
Miss Brown was able to pass
the first three tests of capacity.
She knew she had a decision to
make concerning her treatment.
Hen knowledge of the proposed
medication rivaled that of a first-
year psychiatric resident. She knew
the name, class, side effects, and
purpose of the proposed drug. The
reasons she offered for refusing
the medication were rational and
nonpsychotic. She doubted its ef-
fectiveness in hen case, disliked
the side effects, and was wary of
all mind-altering drugs because of
her past history of addiction.
However, Miss Brown failed the
last and strictest test of capacity,
appreciation. Both the city and
the NYCLU agreed that Miss
Brown had impaired insight and
poor judgment about the conse-
quences of her behavior. She
viewed all of her own actions as
a realistic response to external cm-
cumstanccs and could not under-
stand why others would attempt
to forcibly treat hem.
This brings us to an interesting
point-capacity is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon. At the cx-
tremes, capacity requires as little
as a patient’s ability to offer a
yes-or-no answer to a proposed
treatment on as much as an assur-
ance that no pathological emotional
or motivational pressures influence
his decision (9,10).
The Rivers decision suggests that
when capacity is present, the court
need not examine the merits of
treatment. In these instances, only
the patient, applying his own val-
ucs, can determine if the treat-
ment proposed for him is appno-
pniate. In practice, however, ca-
pacity cannot be examined sepa-
rately from the proposed treat-
ment because tests of capacity arc
adjusted to the risk-benefit ratio
of the intervention under consid-
cration (1 1). If the benefits are
limited, such as taking aspirin for
a headache, or the risks arc great,
such as accepting a heart trans-
plant, very little capacity is needed
to successfully refuse treatment.
Therefore, whether Miss Brown
had sufficient capacity to refuse
an antipsychotic drug depended
in part on the benefits and risks
of drug treatment in her case.
Benefits of treatment. The city
acknowledged that Miss Brown’s
behavior had become more organ-
ized within the first few days of
hospitalization and that hen situ-
ation was not acute. Therefore,
the benefits of medication would
not be in managing a crisis, but
rather in treating an ongoing con-
dition.
Miss Brown had cleanly been
chronically hostile, irritable, and
verbally abusive. In unstructured
situations she often behaved in a
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primitive, regressed, and socially
aberrant manner. She appeared to
provide incomplete information
about hen internal state, but the
behavioral picture was compatible
with a diagnosis of a serious men-
tal illness, either schizophrenia or
manic-depressive disease. Miss
Brown had never received an ade-
quate course of antipsychotic
drugs, whose likely benefits would
be to diminish hen symptoms and
improve her functioning. More-
over, no alternative treatments
were available that would be likely
to ameliorate her symptoms.
The city lawyers had empha-
sized Miss Brown’s potential danger-
ousness. Reducing dangerousness
often weighs heavily in a court’s
consideration of a treatment’s bene-
fits. Yet the evidence for signifi-
cant danger to herself on others
was weak.
Risks of treatment. In examin-
ing risk, courts primarily take into
account the serious side effects
of psychotropic medications. Many
courts have emphasized the intru-
sive nature of these medications.
The court’s focus on risks is in
obvious contrast to that of physi-
cians, who emphasize the benefits
of treatment (12).
Moreover, since antipsychotic
drugs ameliorate symptoms rather
than cure illness, the risks of side
effects extend over the indefinite
period of time that the drugs must
be used. Another risk is that coem-
cion may result in short-term treat-
ment at the cost of the patient’s
long-term cooperation. Physicians
maintain the hope that refusal of
treatment is a symptom, which will
improve along with the illness it-
self. However, too little is known
to conclude that a course of invol-
untary medication in the hospital
leads to long-term improvement
and compliance afterdischage(1 3).
When the patient does not ulti-
mately agree that the treatment
was beneficial, he may be resentful
and reluctant to have further con-
tact with the mental health system.
How did these issues apply to
Miss Brown’s case? Little was
known about Miss Brown’s me-
sponsc to medication. Her total
exposure to antipsychotic drugs
involved a single emergency dose
of 5 mg of intramuscular halopeni-
dol on the day of admission to
Bcllcvuc and brief treatment with
chlorpromazine during her 1985
hospitalization. She reported that
these medications were very un-
pleasant; they made her feel
sleepy, light-headed, and less able
to think. She connected this
dysphoric response to unpleasant
memories of her long period of
drug addiction. Moreover, she
prided herself on hen indepen-
dence. Her stubborn refusal to
accept medication could thus have
been charactenological and not
based on her primary mental ill-
ness.
Timing of treatment. Miss
Brown’s condition was neither me-
cent non emergent, and therefore
a separate question arose about
delaying a course of medication.
Miss Brown had constructed a dis-
charge plan of her own, which
included residing in a Midtown
hotel and receiving various kinds
of practical help from her lawyers.
The less aggressive option could
be tried first, with the understand-
ing that the more intrusive treat-
ment-medication-could be un-
dertaken later if these conserva-
tive measures failed.
The consultant’s recommenda-
tion. As independent psychiatric
consultant, I based my recommen-
dations on the finding that Joyce
Brown had partial capacity to make
the treatment decision. I believed
that Miss Brown had a mental
illness that would benefit from mcdi-
cation and that there were no less
intrusive treatments that were
likely to be effective. Miss Brown
engaged in risk-taking behaviors,
but neither she non others had
come to serious physical ham in
the past, and the risks she took
were not extreme.
I believed that Miss Brown’s
antipathy to treatment was likely
to be increased by coercion and
that she would discontinue the mcdi-
cation once she left the hospital.
She would therefore be likely to
have significant difficulties after
discharge with or without a course
of medication in the hospital.
Given Miss Brown’s fairly good
capacity and the moderate risk-
benefit ratio of involuntarily ad-
ministered antipsychotic drugs, I
recommended that Miss Brown at-
tempt her own dischage plan with-
out receiving medication. If she
required rehospitalization, perhaps
a better case could be made at
that time that medication was nec-
essary to her survival in the corn-
munity.
The judge’s ruling. On January
15, 1988, Judge Irving Kirschen-
baum and I deliberated for oven
two hours, carefully contrasting the
possible outcomes of medicating
Joyce Brown with the possible con-
sequences of allowing hem to leave
the hospital without having been
medicated. The Judge and I
reached a consensus that Miss
Brown’s refusal of medication
should be supported. Taking into
account my findings, Judge Kinsch-
enbaum ruled that Joyce Brown
had the capacity to make a rca-
soned decision and upheld her
wish to refuse medication (14).
He cited her rational objections
to medication and the lack of con-
vincing evidence for dangerous-
ness. He was not persuaded that
the medical benefits would out-
weigh the negative effects of a
course of involuntarily admini-
stered haloperidol.
Hospital discharge. Four days
later, after a 1 2-week hospital stay,
hen treating physician discharged
Miss Brown, stating that without
medication she would receive no
further benefit from continued hos-
pitalization (15). Miss Brown
moved into a room in a Midtown
Manhattan residence for homeless
women that offers onsite meals
and the services of a mental health
team.
In the months after her dis-
charge, the press continued to re-
port the apparently contradictory
aspects of her behavior. For exam-
pie, she was a guest speaker at
Harvard Law School on February
18, 1988, but two weeks later she
was panhandling and cursing on
the streets (16). She was arrested
for heroin possession in Septem-
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bem 1988 and in January 1989 she
was reported to be temporarily
back on her accustomed street con-
ncr (17).
Discussion
Joyce Brown’s case illustrates some
of the ongoing controversies about
the use of coercion in response
to treatment refusal. In New York
State, as in almost all other states
(18), an incompetent refusal of
treatment is not required for com-
mitment. A standard requiring in-
competent refusal of treatment for
commitment is found in the APA
model law on civil commitment,
and its application might signifi-
cantly restrict the number of pa-
tients who could be committed (19).
Miss Brown’s refusal of medica-
tion was upheld based on her ma-
tional and lucid testimony. This
result is uncommon among com-
mitted patients. However, if corn-
mitment required the incompetent
refusal of treatment, such a situ-
ation would be even less likely to
occur. But problems would me-
main, including the definition of
capacity and the fluctuations in
any particular patient’s capacity.
Such problems are apparent in
Miss Brown’s case because her ca-
pacity appeared to improve be-
twcen the time of her commit-
ment and the court hearing about
her medication.
The Brown case also tells us
about the limits of coercion in a
mental health system that has shifted
the locus of care from the hospital,
where involuntary treatment is readi-
ly undertaken, to residential and
outpatient care, where patient co-
operation and responsibility are
essential. Such a system is poorly
equipped to respond to large num-
bers of individuals who are unable
to accept needed services.
Committed patients have their
objections to medication ovennid-
den 67 to 100 percent of the time
(13). While it is easy to win the
battle over medication with a hos-
pitalized patient, the same patient
can almost always avoid treatment
after discharge. Noncompliance
rates among outpatients who take
antipsychotic drugs exceed 40 per-
cent (20).
Therefore it is misleading to
view treatment objections solely
from an inpatient perspective. Even
if Miss Brown had been involun-
taily medicated, she would still
have been free to decide about
her own treatment after leaving
the hospital. If Miss Brown in-
deed had a life-long illness such
as schizophrenia, a short-term so-
lution was less important than a
long-term plan. Persistent medica-
tion refusal among the seriously
mentally ill can result from im-
painrncnts in the capacity for self-
observation (the appreciation stan-
dard of capacity), co-morbidity
with substance abuse or character
pathology, a poor therapeutic ne-
sponse to drugs (2 1), and intoler-
able side effects of medication (22).
These problems have no simple
solutions. Long-term efforts are
required to engage patients in treat-
ment and find acceptable strate-
gies for their care (23).
Miss Brown’s dramatic hospi-
talization and the accompanying
events were temporarily effective
in allowing her to accept place-
ment in a home. Eliciting more
complete and longer-term coop-
enation is another matter. In this
regard, the unusually articulate
Miss Brown typifies the problems
of the disaffiliated homeless.
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